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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWARD: THE MOST CONFUSING BRANCH

Michael C. Dorf
From time to time I have received a version of the following complaint from a
student: "I understood the material when I read it, but I left class more confused than
when I arrived." I usually reply with a line like this: "Good. That means I have done my
job."
If I were to leave things at that, I would probably qualify for some sort of prize for
pedagogical sadism, but there is a method to this particular madness. I like to distinguish
between what I call "bad confusion" and "good confusion." A student who is confused
about an issue to which the law provides a clear answer suffers from bad confusion. She
or he simply needs to spend more time with the materials to master the content of the
doctrine.
Often, however, the law itself is in a state of confusion. One line of cases points in
one direction; another line of cases points in another direction; and some new case falls
either somewhere in between or, despite nominally falling within the scope of each
doctrinal category, raises issues not raised or considered fully in either. Here the law is,
if not completely contradictory, at least indeterminate. No student, indeed, no expert in
the field, can make sense of the new situation simply by staring long enough at or
thinking hard enough about the prior cases.1 A student who suffers good confusion can
locate the law's gaps and ambiguities. He or she knows that an argument can be made for
two or more different outcomes in some category of cases, and that nothing more
* Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges the contributions to this symposium of each of the authors of the articles collected herein.
Thanks also to the editors of the Tulsa Law Review for doing all of the hard work in putting together this issue,
while giving me the honorific of guest editor.
1. Ronald Dworkin argues that even in hard cases, the law provides a unique right answer-the answer
that puts the pre-existing law in its best light, where "best" takes its meaning from principles of political
morality. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 249 (Belknap Press 1986). By contrast, positivists argue that
in such hard cases judges may write opinions purporting to derive their results from formal legal materials but
that they really exercise discretion. See e.g. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 274 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press
1994) (Postscript). I can hardly referee jurisprudence's longest-running debate in a footnote, so I shall limit
myself here to the observation that students and lawyers must take what Hart calls the "external" point of view.
See id. at 88-89. From that perspective, even a judge who is, in some metaphysical sense, really finding unique
right answers, will appear to be exercising discretion to close gaps and resolve ambiguities in the law, because
different people, including different judges, will hold different views about what the best principles of political
morality require.

HeinOnline -- 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 191 2009-2010

TULSA LA W RE VIEW

Vol. 45:191

determinate can be said about such arguments than that he or she finds one more
persuasive than another.
By contrast with students, lawyers, and scholars, judges rarely admit to
experiencing confusion, either good or bad, even when the law plainly contains internal
tensions. Consider the situation the Supreme Court faced in the 2007 case of Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1. 2 Seattle and, in a
companion case, a school district in the Louisville area, had voluntarily undertaken raceconscious student assignment measures to reduce de facto racial segregation in public
schools. Were these measures constitutional? The prior cases pointed in two directions.
The Court's civil-rights era decisions held that race-conscious student assignments could
be ordered as a remedy for past unconstitutional segregation and said in dicta that
voluntary race-based integration was also permissible; 3 yet those cases pre-dated a line
of affirmative action cases requiring that all classifications based on race be justified by
exacting standards. 4 The Court split 5-4 on the outcome, with the Court's five most
conservative Justices giving controlling effect to the affirmative action cases and the four
more liberal Justices crediting the civil-rights-era dicta. Justice Kennedy split the
difference. He would have permitted race-conscious measures that the plurality's
reasoning would have forbidden. 5 But even Justice Kennedy did not treat the prior case
law as contradictory. He simply chose a reconciliation point somewhere in between the
points chosen by the plurality and the dissent.
To be sure, judges occasionally do acknowledge contradictory strands in their prior
cases, 6 but such acknowledgments clearly represent the exception. Unless overruling
precedents, judges much more commonly use the rhetoric of synthesis in explaining
away or ignoring inconsistencies in prior doctrine. That judicial hesitation to
acknowledge existing tensions in the law-the reluctance to express good confusioncan lead to decisions that are themselves confusing.
Consider the contributions to this issue. Each of the articles by Professors
Bhagwat, Schwartz, and Stein mixes substantive criticism of the Supreme Court with a
lament about the confusion the Court's doctrines engender.
Professor Bhagwat observes that "much of modem preemption law is
confused .

.

. ,7 Indeed, he says "[t]he-law of preemption generally, and the law of

8
agency preemption in particular, is infamous for its vagueness and unpredictability."

2. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
3. See e.g. Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd.of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
4. See e.g. Grutter v. Bollinger, 509 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); AdarandConstructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 224 (1995).
5. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through
other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting
students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.")
6. See e.g. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist,

J., concurring in the judgment) (wondering whether case law governing agency adjudication should be likened
to "landmarks on a judicial 'darkling plain' where 'ignorant armies' have clashed by night").
7. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?
45 Tulsa L. Rev. 197, 198 (2009).

8. Id at 197.
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Bhagwat shows how the case on which he focuses-Wyeth v. Levine9-resolves one
small puzzle about preemption 1 ° even as it leaves unanswered basic questions about the
scope of congressional power to confer on federal agencies the authority to preempt state
laws.11 In Wyeth, only Justice Thomas, Bhagwat says, adequately addressed the
fundamental questions of federalism in play in agency preemption. 12 Yet given Justice
Thomas's willingness to express idiosyncratic views on a range of issues-including
federalism 13--- one cannot be very optimistic about the prospect of his inspiring a
wholesale doctrinal reformulation in this area.
Professor Schwartz also mixes substantive critique with a comment on confusion.
Although he presents the civil rights cases from the 2008 Supreme Court Term
dispassionately, there is nonetheless a note of disappointment in his conclusion that "on14
the whole § 1983 defendants fared decisively better on the most important issues."
Schwartz is especially critical of the catch-22 in which the Court appears to have placed
plaintiffs bringing due process complaints: "The Court will deny the claimed due process
right when state legislatures are by and large recognizing the right, . . . and when by and
large they are not . ...

"

15 Schwartz does not simply disagree with the Court's treatment

of civil rights plaintiffs, however. He also finds contradictions in the doctrine. For
example, he states that the Supreme Court's 2007 ruling in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly 6 generated considerable uncertainty and confusion .... 17
Professor Stein goes further, expressing wry gratitude for the fact that Twombly is
"so analytically incoherent as to limit its extension to other cases." 18 The case that
principally occupies Stein's attention-Ashcroft v. Iqbal-is likewise most
straightforwardly read, he argues, as endorsing a proposition at odds with wellestablished equal protection doctrine: It appears to say that a facially race-based
government policy does not trigger strict scrutiny unless it was adopted for an invidious
purpose. 19 By showing how the defense of qualified immunity cast a shadow over the
plaintiffs' primafacie case, Stein is able to make sense of the Court's conclusion in Iqbal
that it is implausible to infer that the Attorney General and FBI Director ordered a
discriminatory pattern of arrests. My own view of the Court's opinion is somewhat less

9. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
10. Bhagwat, supra n. 7 at 220-221 ("Wyeth has resolved one doctrinal question, holding that the
presumption against preemption applies in implied conflict preemption cases as well as in express preemption
cases.").
11. See id. at 222 ("Wyeth v. Levine decision thus provides some, but only limited clarity on issues relating
to agency preemption.")
12. See id. at 229.
13. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging a construction of
congressional power to regulate commerce that would exclude "productive activities such as manufacturing
and agriculture")
14. Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court § 1983 Decisions-October2008 Term, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 231, 232
(2009).
15. Id. at 251-252 (discussing District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 129
S.Ct. 2308 (2009) and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
16. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
17. Schwartz, supran. 14, at 234.
18. Allan R. Stein, Confining Iqbal, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 277, 284 (2010).
19. See id at 289, 298.
20. See id. at 300.
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sympathethic, 2 1 but what is striking is that one needs a "take" on Iqbal to understand it.
On its own, the Court's opinion mostly produces head scratching.
Or at least that is where the Supreme Court's cases lead until they are carefully
explained and unpacked by skilled scholars. Mixed in with criticism, readers will find
just such explanations and unpacking in the contributions to this issue by Professors
Bhagwat, Schwartz, and Stein. In Professor Colburn's contribution they will find
something in the same spirit but simultaneously grander and bleaker. Whereas Bhagwat,
Schwartz, and Stein reveal a Supreme Court whose rhetorical norms impede its ability to
speak clearly, Colbum expressly levels that same complaint at the legal system as a
whole-at least insofar as it is thought to produce something called "environmental
22
law."
Here we learn that all of the actors, not just the courts, are insincere. Congress
enacts open-ended statutes that punt to administrative agencies the hard work of
weighing any regulation's costs and benefits; agencies in turn must balance not only
costs and benefits, but also politics; public interest organizations litigating on behalf of
tighter environmental regulation must identify demons to be held accountable, even
though we the people-through the collective impacts of our individual choices-may be
the real culprits; 23 and the courts then decide "pseudo-questions" bearing little
resemblance to the real stakes. 24 Colburn provides a valuable service in demonstrating
the distance between "environmental law" as practiced by the Supreme Court and actual
protection of the natural environment, such as it is. But it is the sort of service-a literal
25
disillusionment-for which thanks are unlikely to be forthcoming.
Gauged by the hearings to confirm recently appointed Supreme Court Justiceswho, whether expected to be liberal or conservative, assured the Senators that they would
simply follow the law without letting their personal views affect their decisions26-the
public expects formalism from the courts. Never mind that legal scholars debunked the
27
mechanistic version of formalism well over a century ago.
One need not be a thoroughgoing legal realist or "crit" to see that the sorts of cases
that reach the Supreme Court call for the filling in of the law's gaps and the resolution of
21. See Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal andBad Apples, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 217 (2010) (connecting the Iqbal
opinion's logic with the Bush and Obama Administrations' narrative of detainee abuse as the work of a "few
bad apples").
22. See Jamison E. Colbum, The Cynic at the Circus, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 307 (2010).
23. See id at 319 (citing Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, Break Through: From the Death of
Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility201-204 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2007)).
24. See id.
25. Cf Plato, Republic 170 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publg. Co. 1974) ("As for the man who had tried
to free" the people chained in the cave, mistaking shadows for reality, "and lead them upward, if they could
somehow lay their hands on him and kill him, they would do so.")
26. See Sonia Sotomayor, Address, Opening Statement of Judge Sonia Sotomayor Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., (D.C. 2009) (available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3959&witid=8102);
John G. Roberts, Jr., Address, Statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United
(available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/shl09States 56 (D.C. 2005)
158/browse.html) (likening judging to umpiring a baseball game); but see Richard A. Posner, The Role of the
Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1049, 1051 (2006) ("No serious person thinks that the rules
that judges in our system apply, particularly appellate judges and most particularly the Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, are given to them the way the rules of baseball are given to umpires.").
27. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law I (Dover 1991) ("The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience.").
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its contradictions. Yet so long as the public demands that the Court downplay this role, it
will produce confusing doctrine. That, in turn, will continue to make works like the four
articles in this issue essential reading.
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